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Complex decision models in expert systems often depend upon a number of utilities and subjective probabilities for an individual.
Although these values can be estimated for entire populations or demographic subgroups, a model should be customized to the indi-
viduals speciﬁc parameter values. This process can be onerous and ineﬃcient for practical decisions. We propose an interactive
approach for incrementally improving our knowledge about a speciﬁc individuals parameter values, including utilities and proba-
bilities, given a decision model and a prior joint probability distribution over the parameter values. We deﬁne the concept of value of
elicitation and use it to determine dynamically the next most informative elicitation for a given individual. We evaluated the
approach using an example model and demonstrate that we can improve the decision quality by focusing on those parameter values
most material to the decision.
 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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Expert systems have been gaining popularity in many
domains, especially medicine, in which diﬀerent individ-
uals regularly make similar decisions [1–9]. Many of
these systems are based on probabilistic models of deci-
sion under uncertainty. Complex decision models in
such expert systems often contain generic utilities and
probabilities that represent average values for entire
populations or demographic subgroups. Although indi-
viduals might have characteristics that match them to a
speciﬁc population context, they may not have values
representative of their group. Because of this, recom-
mendations or insights from using such systems may
not be acceptable for such cases [10]. However, it is
not always possible to identify a priori with which indi-1532-0464/$ - see front matter  2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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stanford.edu (R.D. Shachter).viduals this will occur. Therefore, it is necessary to cus-
tom-tailor the model for every individual.
To apply a generic decision model to a speciﬁc indi-
vidual, the parameter values in the model should be cus-
tomized for that speciﬁc individual. Multiple
applications of this process have been undertaken [11–
13], and the complexity of the task lends itself readily
to computational tools [14]. Because the number of val-
ues these models contain can be quite large and the
acquisition of accurate values can be an onerous and
ineﬃcient process, more eﬃcient methods are needed.
We believe approximate methods may be a means to this
end.
Traditional approaches for making decisions based
on a rational or normative model require a complete
understanding of the parameter values in the model
for a speciﬁc individual. Although acquiring informa-
tion about state probabilities or consequence utilities
for a population or group only needs to be done once
during system development, obtaining knowledge about
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the system is used.
This assessment process can be challenging for any
given individual, even when performed by a human ex-
pert. Diﬀerent techniques yield diﬀerent values for the
same individual and value being assessed [15]. It is
not uncommon for assessed values to change after
other questions are asked or more information is pre-
sented [16]. Often the assessment questions require
the individual to assign a value to an ‘‘imagined’’ situ-
ation that will occur in the future rather than a state
that they have experienced already. This results in an
educated guess of the value rather than the true value
(i.e., the individuals actual internal valuation that has
yet to be explicitly quantiﬁed). After a while, the indi-
vidual may tire, and the assessments become less coher-
ent, making long assessment processes impractical and
erroneous.
Previous approaches to customizing generic models
have deﬁned customization tasks as classiﬁcation prob-
lems. The classiﬁcation approach customizes the model
through a series of discriminator questions, often pre-se-
lected. The process seeks to use a minimal number of
categorical questions to determine an optimal policy.
Classiﬁcation does not attempt to provide insight into
the decision for the decision maker, rather only to deter-
mine the optimal decision policy with a minimal amount
of information.
Jimison et al. [17] demonstrated that generic decision
models can be tailored for individual patients to provide
patient-speciﬁc educational material. This work intro-
duced a means to use parameter uncertainty as way to
custom-tailor explanations of decision models by repre-
senting expected utilities in the model as uncertain quan-
tities instead of point estimates. Utilities for an
individual were not assessed, but entered into the system
by the researchers. The work laid the groundwork for
modeling parameter values as distributions rather than
point estimates. Although it did consider prioritizing
assessment order based on elimination of uncertainty
in values (parameter values were assumed to have zero
variance after assessment) in a pre-computed order, it
did not address issues of interactive assessment.
Although not a classiﬁcation approach to individualize
decision models itself, Poh and Horvitz [18] developed
a framework for estimating the value of reﬁning the
information in and structure of decision models.
Hornberger et al. [19] used classiﬁcation and regres-
sion-tree (CART) analysis [20] to determine the sets of
preference in a decision model that most inﬂuence the
decision. They were able to pre-determine which prefer-
ences were most important to obtain for a given model,
and then assessed values for those preferences from each
patient. Patients were then classiﬁed into diﬀerent policy
groups based on the reduced model from the original
CART analysis.Scott et al. [21] demonstrated an approach to opti-
mize the ordering of assessments based on minimization
of contributed variance in the expected utility. They as-
sumed that diﬀerences between decision policies were
approximately normally distributed and pre-computed
the amount of variance of each model parameters
uncertainty contributed to the model prediction. Using
this information, an optimal assessment ordering for a
given set of population priors was selected to maximize
the reduction of variance in the model prediction with
each assessment.
Chajewska et al. [22] developed an approach that eﬃ-
ciently determines the optimal policy for an individual
based upon a categorization process. The approach is
similar to that of Hornberger et al. [19], but uses a clas-
siﬁcation tree that is generated in advance. It represents
utilities as uncertain quantities [17] and terminates the
assessment process once the diﬀerence between the
remaining possible policies in the tree falls below a de-
ﬁned threshold. The approach attempts to minimize
the assessments necessary by asking categorical ques-
tions for each parameter in the model, rather than using
traditional elicitation instruments [16]. Like the other
approaches, it assumes that once a value is observed,
it is known with certainty, and does not provide a means
for backtracking through the classiﬁcation tree without
starting over from the beginning.
Finally, Sanders et al. [23] demonstrated that clinical
practice guidelines custom-tailored to individual groups
could be automatically generated from decision models.
Clinical practice guidelines have been gaining favor
since they avoid the need to perform individual decision
analyses for patients. The Institute of Medicine deﬁnes
them as ‘‘systematically developed statements to assist
physician and patient decisions about appropriate
healthcare for speciﬁc clinical circumstances’’ [24]. By
using generic utilities and probabilities assessed for en-
tire populations or demographic subgroups, it is possi-
ble to avoid individual assessments for each patient
and only perform the analysis once for every representa-
tive subpopulation.
While these approaches have provided a solid foun-
dation to identify an optimal decision policy with mini-
mal information, they do not address some key issues
that arise when using such systems for interactive con-
texts such as automated decision support. The ﬁrst ma-
jor drawback of these methods is that they assume
assessments are perfectly observed and can only be
made once. There is no way to recognize error in the
measurement, to explicitly handle errors, or for adjust-
ing the path of the interaction should an assessment er-
ror be made. Second, they are not capable of
representing uncertainty about a particular parameter
value in the model or the decision policy deemed to be
optimal. Third, should the model structure or the values
of the non-assessable model parameters change, the split
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recomputed and the individuals information reassessed.
Fourth, they do not provide methods for evaluating the
optimality of the interactive process, only for determin-
ing optimal assessment orderings for such processes.
That is, the other approaches are unable to provide an
estimate of the error in the individualized model (i.e.,
a measure of the value of the interaction) at any point
during the customization process.
We developed an approach that extends these meth-
ods further to address these new issues. Our approach
diﬀers in one very important way: we view parameter
assessments as noisy sensors. We propose an alternative
implementation that represents all assessable parameters
in the model as uncertain quantities and uses a decision
model initially parametrized with population priors to
guide the customization of the decision model using
parameter assessments from an individual as evidence.
We view individuals as naı¨ve experts about their values
who are challenged in quantifying them. We explicitly
model error in the measurements of quantities and
incorporate the measurements as evidence rather than
instantiating them as parameter values. We obtain mea-
surements of the individuals values using computer-
based versions of standard assessment instruments [16]
rather than categorical questions. The answers for these
instruments can be more diﬃcult to obtain than categor-
ical approaches, but are less aﬀected by known biases
[25] and contain more information.
Lindley et al. [26] developed a framework for inte-
grating observations from noisy sensors to update a
joint distribution on a set of parameters, representing
probability values. A log-odds transformation enables
an eﬃcient multi-variate Gaussian representation for
the posterior joint distribution. We extended this repre-
sentation to apply to parameters in a decision model.
Our approach is designed to make the automated
decision support process practical by obtaining a rea-
sonable approximation to an individuals parameter val-
ues for any number of assessments via a real-time
interaction [27]. We note that our solution manages cus-
tomization using any of the model parameters, not just
the utility values. Our goal is to eﬃciently provide in-
sight into the decision problem, as well as selecting an
optimal policy with an estimate of certainty. We accom-
plish this by iteratively reﬁning our knowledge of an
individuals true values, determining which question to
ask next based upon the potential beneﬁt from improved
decision making. Using knowledge about the decision to
inform the interaction, we can make the individualiza-
tion of generic decision models more eﬃcient.
Although we do not determine the global optimal
assessment order in advance for each individual, we de-
velop a simple algorithm to select the locally optimal or-
der. As we gather evidence about the individuals
parameter values, we can ask the most informativequestion at each stage of assessment based on our cur-
rent knowledge of the values. Therefore, using a greedy
algorithm with myopic search, we try to maximize the
eﬃciency of the individualization process.
Section 2 presents how we represent decisions and
values and our uncertainty about them. Section 3 de-
scribes our algorithm for eﬃciently individualizing gen-
eric decision models. Section 4 details the results from
simulation-based evaluation of the algorithm. Section
5 reviews the work upon which this research is built
and provides some suggestions for extending it.2. Modeling decisions and values
This section reviews some basic concepts and ideas
used in decision and utility theory, and how they are
modeled and manipulated in the context of a speciﬁc
example. This overview is not exhaustive and we refer
the reader to relevant sources for further discussion.
2.1. Decision models
Bayesian decision models are mathematical and
graphical representations of choice under uncertainty.
These models can be represented as trees or inﬂuence
diagrams [28], directed graph networks representing a
choice from the viewpoint of a single decision maker.
For anyBayesian decisionmodel, we can deﬁne a nota-
tion that allows us to describe our method in general. Let
D be the set of all decisions in the model domain,
{d1, . . . ,dm}. Let S be the chance states in the model do-
main, {s1, . . . , sn}. Let C be the set of mutually exclusive
consequences in themodel domain, {c1, . . . ,co}.D is com-
pletely under the control of the decision maker, while S is
uncertain and beyond decision makers control. The deci-
sion maker cares about C and it inherits uncertainty, and
the decision makers control through S and D. We can
then deﬁne P as the set of decision policies in the model,
{p1, . . . ,pp}, such that every member of P is a sequence
of decisions from D, possibly contingent on S. All of the
uncertainty about actions can now be isolated uncondi-
tionally in S. Therefore, without loss of generality, we ob-
tain the decision model in normal form shown in Fig. 1.
There is a choice among policies P, an uncertain state S,
and consequence C determined by P and S.
Utility values are assigned to the consequences, C,
and the expected utility is computed for each. The opti-
mal policy is deﬁned to be the policy that maximizes the
decision makers expected utility for a given parameter-
ization of the model.
2.2. Utility functions
Utility functions are key component of decision mod-
els that describe the value that the decision maker
Fig. 1. An example of a generic decision model in normal form [52] as
an inﬂuence diagram. Square nodes represent acts, oval nodes
represent chance events, and rounded box nodes represent values or
utilities. Arrows between nodes represent relevance.
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model. The utility function for a given element of C
can range in complexity from a single number to a com-
plex function of several attributes. Utilities, like proba-
bilities, often exhibit dependence. As the size of C
grows and the complexity of its associated utility func-
tions increases, the quantity of possible assessments
grows rapidly. If there is dependence among attributes,
the number of assessable states can grow exponentially.
Utility functions have been explicitly assessed [29],
determined through meta-analysis [30], observed as re-
vealed preferences through simulated decision scenarios
Farr and Shachter [31], or learned from databases of
values [32]. Utility functions have also been represented
as uncertain quantities and used to provide individual-
ized explanations of decision models [17,22]. We take
the latter route, using a model-based approach that cap-
tures the structure of a utility model with parameter val-
ues and can be tailored to each individual.
2.3. Parameter value assessments
One of the major challenges of assessing values for
utilities and subjective probabilities is that individuals
have diﬃculty quantifying their feelings or beliefs. To
assist in this task, several standardized methods have
been developed to obtain measurements of subjective
probability and utility values. Probabilities are often as-
sessed using visual analog scales and probability wheels.
Utilities are usually assessed using methods such as vi-
sual analog scale, standard gamble, and time-trade-oﬀ.
Utilities can also be represented economically by an
individuals willingness-to-pay.
A visual analog scale instrument [33] is usually repre-
sented as a horizontal or vertical rule with anchor points
at each end. The individual selects a point along the line
that best represents the value being assessed. A standard
gamble instrument is used to assess an individuals value
taking into account the individuals attitude toward risk.Given a preferences order of a1  a2  a3, the individual
is asked what probability p is the gamble between a1
with probability p and a3 with probability (1  p) equiv-
alent to obtaining a2 for certain. Once the value of p has
been determined, it becomes the utility of a2.
A time-trade-oﬀ instrument [34] measures an individ-
uals value taking into account the time discount rate,
the amount the individual devalues future events. Given
a preference order a1  a2, the individual is asked what
duration of time, t, with a2 is equivalent to a set duration
of time, t0 with a1. A probability wheel is used by asking
the individual to set the area of the arc p on the wheel
such that it represents the probability being elicited.
Willingness-to-pay is a measure of how much money
an individual is willing to pay to avoid experiencing a gi-
ven outcome or health state [35]. Individuals are asked
what amount of money, m2, with health state a2 would
they pay to alter the outcome to their current health
a1 with money m1. The willingness-to-pay is then
m2  m1.
2.4. Value assessments as evidence
Because of their nature and the manner by which
they are obtained, value assessments are imperfect
observations of parameter values. Traditionally, they
have been treated as direct observations of personal val-
ues without regard for any error that might occur in the
assessment. In fact, value assessments can be as noisy, if
not more so, than other data collected about a patients
such as laboratory tests. Our approach allows us to rep-
resent this uncertainty by treating the assessments as
imperfect measurements which provide observable evi-
dence of the true values. Thus, we are able to treat
assessments made as observed evidence towards the pa-
tients values. This has a strong advantage over the tra-
ditional approach: we can explicitly represent the error
associated with the assessments and eﬃciently update
our beliefs about the values given the observations that
we have made.
Let T be the set of all parameters in the model do-
main, {t1, . . . , ti}. Let E be the set of all evidence, or
assessments, {e1,1, . . . ,ei,j}, that we have observed about
T, where ei,j is the jth assessment of the ith parameter.
Fig. 2 shows an augmented form of the general deci-
sion model in Fig. 1 demonstrating how assessed values
are used as evidence to update our beliefs about the val-
ues. It represents how we extend the base decision model
to incorporate noisy observations about the model
parameters into the model itself. It shows the relation-
ships among the policies, P, the uncertain states, S,
the consequences, C, the values, T, and the evidence,
E. Uncertain states are conditioned by the parameters.
Some of those parameters describe the utility, so conse-
quences are now a deterministic function of parameters
as well as policies and states. Our prior distribution over
Fig. 2. The generic decision model in normal form augmented to
represent how evidence in the form of parameter assessment is used to
condition the belief about parameter values and aﬀect the policy
choice. It represents how we extend the base decision model to
incorporate noisy observations about the model parameters into the
model itself. The dashed arrow is an informational arc, denoting that E
is known before P is chosen.
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imperfect observations of the parameters. Finally, the
arc from E to P is informational, denoting that E is ob-
served before P is chosen.
2.5. Representing parameter uncertainty
Because we are not obtaining complete information
about an individuals parameter values, we represent
them in the model as uncertain quantities. Other ap-
proaches have used constraints or preference ordering
to assess and model parameter values. In this paper,
we have chosen to model parameter values as continu-
ous-valued random variables and explicitly ask individ-
uals for an estimate of their own values.
Elicited probability and utility values are subjective
estimates that we assume are constrained on the interval
[0,1]. In many medical decision models, there can be
more signiﬁcance in the distinction between the values
of 0.98 and 0.99 than between the values of 0.50 and
0.51. In fact, 0.99 vs. 0.995 can be even more signiﬁcant
than either of them.
To address this, we model parameter values assum-
ing that their log-odds transforms are multi-variate
Gaussian, where the log-odds, lo, of a parameter va-
lue x is lo (x) = ln ((x)/(1  x)). This way, parameter
values can be modeled using a multi-variate Gaussian
probability density function (PDF) while remaining in
the [0,1] interval. These measurements tend to have
error that is approximately Gaussian in the log-odds
space independent of the extremeness of the value
[26].
When the log-odds of the parameter values are
Gaussian distributed, the distribution for the parameter
values is determined. Unfortunately, neither this distri-
bution nor its moments can be represented in closed
form. We devised numerical methods to eﬃciently esti-
mate the mean and variance in the natural parameterspace using interpolation search on a pre-built value
grid. This permits us to assess priors and display poste-
riors in the parameters natural space while eﬃciently
representing dependence and updating the distributions
in the multi-variate Gaussian space [27].3. The algorithm
Our approach is based on the iterative reﬁnement of
our belief about the individuals parameter values
through the acquisition of evidence in the form of
parameter value assessments. We dynamically determine
the assessment question that is likely to provide the most
information given the current state of information. This
results in an order of assessments that is not pre-com-
puted, but is instead based upon the response that the
individual provides. We describe a greedy algorithm
with myopic search. The algorithm can be stopped at
anytime to yield insights based on all of the information
collected to that point. A greedy search seems to work
well for this problem, allowing the system to respond
quickly enough for real-time interaction and without
imposing requirements about the number of questions
to be asked. Because of this, we are also able to provide
insight at any stopping point, rather than requiring a full
set of observations be made.
The algorithm begins by calculating the incremental
value of obtaining perfect information for each of the
parameters of interest, which we call the value of
elicitation (VOE). It selects the parameter with the
maximum net value of elicitation and makes an assess-
ment for the parameter. Based on this assessment, the
beliefs about the model parameters are updated and
the VOE (and possibly the cost of elicitation) for the
assessable parameters is again computed. The
algorithm continues to assess and update its knowledge
until the maximum net value of elicitation overall the
parameters is zero or the user halts the process. We
discuss below each of these stages of the process, fol-
lowed by an example.
3.1. Initial conditions
The algorithm starts with a joint prior PDF over the
individuals parameter values. This prior may be either
non-informative or based on a previous clustering into
a studied demographic group. These PDFs can be
learned or directly studied in the desired populations
as described above.
Since full elicitation of values can be impractical,
guidelines are often used in ﬁelds such as medicine to
avoid assessing values for every individual. In cases
where priors are not available, the assumptions used in
the guidelines for parameter values can be used as the
individuals initial PDF.
Fig. 3. A graphical representation of the value of elicitation for the ith
parameter, ti, in the set of T. The PDF for p (ti) is shown in the bottom
panel. The expected utility of each of four policies in terms of ti is
displayed in the top panel. The solid heavy line represents the optimal
policy with our current knowledge, p (l). The double dashed heavy line
represents the globally optimal policy, p (t). The shaded region in the
top panel represents the diﬀerence between the globally optimal policy
and the locally optimal policy. The value of elicitation is the integral of
the product of the shaded regions in both panels.
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After each assessment is made, it is necessary to
determine the net value of an additional assessment.
While the value of elicitation is always a non-negative
value, it will eventually be too small to make a question
worthwhile. The algorithm can stop the interaction at
this point, or allow users to determine for themselves
whether to continue the assessment process or choose
to stop it at any time.
Traditionally, the expected beneﬁt of obtaining a
perfect observation of a point estimate for an observa-
ble parameter value has been calculated using the value
of perfect information or clairvoyance. We have ex-
tended this concept to the assessments of unobservable
value distributions. To custom-tailor an assessment
ordering for an individual, we determine the incremen-
tal value of observing each possible preference param-
eter, the value of elicitation. This value of elicitation is
just the value of perfect information on a patient-spe-
ciﬁc parameter. As a result, the value of elicitation
incorporates our current state of information and pos-
terior distribution on the parameters, given our prior
beliefs and the noisy observations to this point. It al-
lows us to compare the beneﬁts of assessing diﬀerent
parameters.
The increasing popularity of cost-eﬀectiveness re-
search has also driven a net beneﬁt approach that uses
the value of obtaining information about a model
parameter to determine whether a trial or study is
worthwhile to learn the population average, the ex-
pected value of partial perfect information (EVPI)
[36]. While the valuation metric for information is sim-
ilar, the approach has a diﬀerent goal of eﬃcient deci-
sion making at a population level, and multiple
observations are not made (generally a trial or study
either has enough power to determine the population
value or not).
At any point in the assessment process, we have a
joint probability distribution, p (t), over the values for
the parameters in the model, T. For any value t of T
there is an optimal policy p (t), which is the policy that
maximizes expected utility given that T = t,
E½U jt; pðtÞ ¼ maxpðE½U jt; pÞ: ð1Þ
Because the value surface for each policy is linear in t,
the optimal policy with our current knowledge is p (l),
where l is the current mean of p (t),
maxpðEt½E½U jt; pÞ ¼ maxpðE½U jE½t; pÞ
¼ E½U jl; pðlÞ: ð2Þ
We can determine the expected value of observing T be-
fore choosing our policy. It is the diﬀerence between the
best policy with our current knowledge, p (l), and the
policy p (t) we would adopt if we observed the parameter
t. This diﬀerence is the value of elicitation,VOE ¼ Et½maxpðE½U jt; pÞ maxpðEt½E½U jt; pÞ ð3Þ
¼ EtðE½U jt; pðtÞÞ  E½U jl; pðlÞ ð4Þ




ðE½U jt; pðtÞ  E½U jt; pðlÞÞpðtÞdt: ð6Þ
Fig. 3 graphically represents the value of elicitation
for the ith parameter, ti, in the set of T. The PDF for
p (ti) is shown in the bottom panel. The expected utility
of each of four policies in terms of ti is displayed in the
top panel. The solid heavy line represents the optimal
policy with our current knowledge, p (l). The double
dashed heavy line represents the globally optimal policy,
p (t). The shaded region in the top panel represents the
diﬀerence between the globally optimal policy and the
locally optimal policy. The value of elicitation is the
integral of the product of the shaded regions in both
panels. Just as the value of perfect information has been
generalized to imperfect experimental evidence using the
value of sample information [37], we can extend this re-
sult to compute the value of an imperfect observation, s,
given a distribution p (s|t) for the measurement error, by
computing an optimal policy for each possible observa-
tion s. However, we have found that with the VOE we
get suﬃcient guidance about assessment without need-
ing to do this considerably more complex calculation.
The above integral is approximated using numerical
integration methods.
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crude, the reﬁnement of the value is only important to
pursue it if it has enough potential to lead to a locally
optimal policy other than the current optimal policy in
light of the other assessments.
This deﬁnition captures several aspects of behavior
for each parameter. Whenever the decision is insensitive
to a parameter (i.e., there is only one dominant policy
over the parameters PDF), its value of elicitation is 0.
It also captures the notion of diminishing returns on
assessment of values. If a parameter is assessed more
than once, there is less information provided by each
additional assessment.
Since the parameters can be dependent, updating the
belief for one parameter can impact other parameters.
Learning about one value might result in parameters
becoming material that previously were not or vice ver-
sa. This might be the case when an assessment reveals
that the individual falls into a special group that requires
information about previously immaterial values, or
when the new evidence suggests that the decision is
insensitive to other values.
3.3. Cost of elicitation
Each assessment considered has a cost (time, eﬀort on
the part of the patient, increasing fatigue, etc.) associ-
ated with it. The net value of actually making the assess-
ment needs to be calculated to determine if the
assessment is worthwhile. While the value of elicitation
is always a non-negative value, it can still be too small
to make an assessment worthwhile. Akin to the value
of elicitation capturing the incremental beneﬁt antici-
pated from the measurement, the cost of elicitation
(COE) reﬂects the incremental cost associated with mak-
ing the observation.
The cost of elicitation can be any arbitrary function
that represents a patients utility loss, or disutility, for
the assessment experience. There are several factors
to consider when trying to decide when a question
might be informative or counterproductive: the number
of times the current parameter has been assessed, the
total number of assessments, the psychological burden
of the question, the time required to educate the pa-
tient about the parameter, and the time required to an-
swer the question. Ultimately, the patient interacting
with the system decides when to terminate the
interaction.
Being asked multiple similar questions can be annoy-
ing to the patient and a long assessment process can lead
to fatigue. Also, attention should be paid to the psycho-
logical weight of the question being asked. An example
of this would be assessing a value for having a vaccina-
tion versus having spontaneous bleeding from a medica-
tion. Finally, since most values are for ‘‘imagined’’
scenarios, it is necessary to educate patients about thesituation well enough so that the value quantiﬁed corre-
sponds to the situation presented. For some cases, this
education process can be rather diﬃcult and long.
We assess the disutility implicitly, asking the patient
if they would be willing to answer a question (about
the parameter with maximum value of elicitation) antic-
ipating that we would be able to learn enough about
them such that we might be able to make a decision that
would improve their outcome by a given amount (the
VOE). The patient always has the option of declining
the assessment.
3.4. Value assessment selection
One of the key aspects of our approach is the ability
of the algorithm to select the parameter that should
next be examined. This selection is made on the basis
of which parameter is myopically most material to
the decision. It might even be a reassessment of a
parameter value. The selection of the method used to
make the assessment is dictated primarily by the under-
lying model. Since the diﬀerent methods capture diﬀer-
ent aspects of the patients preference structure (e.g.,
risk attitude with the standard gamble), the assessment
instrument should be appropriate to the parameter
being elicited.
The selection is based upon the net value of elicita-
tion. Since the value of elicitation captures the worthi-
ness of considering the true value of the parameter, it
is a natural choice for this task. We select the parameter
that has the maximum net value of elicitation and, as
long as the individual is willing or the value of elicitation
is large enough to make the elicitation worthwhile, we
assess the value. After a value x is elicited from the indi-
vidual, we convert the value from the natural space of
the parameter into the multi-variate Gaussian space
using the log-odds transformation with a mean of
lo (x) and the assigned error to the measurement.
Determining the measurement error is diﬃcult since
is cannot itself be directly measured. We have assumed
a reasonable measurement error to be constant in the
log-odds space at r2 = 0.1 for most assessments. This
value can be further reﬁned by asking the patient to
rate how certain they are about their assessed value
and using this subjective conﬁdence interval to con-
struct the variance structure in the log-odds space. As
an example, consider a patient who provides an as-
sessed value of 0.76 (log-odds 3.17) with a 90% cer-
tainty that their value lies between 0.75 (log-odds
3.00) and 0.77 (log-odds 3.35). It would be possible to
determine the log-odds variance, r2, for which approx-
imately 90% of the probability density of N (3.17,r2) in
the log-odds space lies between 3.00 and 3.35. This dis-
tribution could also be conditioned on an assumed con-
stant error in the assessment process which is not
obvious to the patient.
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Whenever we have an observation of a parameter
assessment, we treat it as evidence in our model and
use it to obtain a new posterior joint PDF for the
parameter values.
Because we model the log-odds of the parameter val-
ues as multi-variate Gaussians, it is possible to utilize
existing representations for continuous-valued inﬂuence
diagrams [38] and approaches to learning them from
data [39]. This representation implicitly maintains a
covariance matrix, capturing the dependence among
the parameter values. This allows us to model complex
dependency relationships between parameter values
explicitly within our framework.
Once a value x is elicited from the individual, the va-
lue is transformed from the natural space of the param-
eter into the multi-variate Gaussian space using the
appropriate transformation and error assigned to the
measurement. Since the transformed parameter values
are modeled as multi-variate Gaussians, it is possible
to utilize existing representations for continuous-valued
inﬂuence diagrams [38] and approaches to learning them
from previously observed data [39].
Fig. 4 shows an example of evidence updating. The
ﬁgure shows three quantities: X1, X2, X3. Each quantity
has an initial mean and standard deviation. The quanti-
ties are observed with evidence: Y11, Y21, Y22, Y31, Y32,
Y33. Each observation is made with the given mean and
standard deviation.
The updating can be done using arc reversal in the
inﬂuence diagram. Given that node i is a conditioning
predecessor for node j and no other directed paths exist
from i to j, then for evidence nodes K:
E½X jjY K  ¼ lj þ
X
k2K
ðcjk þ cikbijÞðY k  lkÞ; ð7Þ






(µ21, σ21) (µ22, σ22)(µ11, σ11)
(µ2, σ2)(µ1, σ1)
Fig. 4. An example of updating quantity beliefs with evidence. The inﬂuence




i is zero, then:
bji ¼ bijr2i =ðr2j þ b2ijr2i Þ; ð9Þ
E½X ijX j; Y K  ¼ li þ
X
k2K
ðbik  ðbjk þ bikbijÞbjiÞðY k  lkÞ
þ bjiðX j  ljÞ; ð10Þ
V ½X ijX j; Y K  ¼ r2j bji=bij: ð11Þ
The updating can also be approached using a linear
approximation representation [40]. Let X and Y be
Gaussian vectors such that:
~lX ¼ E½X ; ~r2X ¼ V ½X ; ð12Þ
~lY ¼ E½Y ; ~r2Y ¼ V ½Y ; ð13Þ
Cov½X ; Y  ¼ E½XY T  E½X E½Y T: ð14Þ
Suppose that V [Y] is non-singular. Then, given that
Y is observed with values Y = y,
E½X jY ¼ y ¼ E½X  þ Cov½X ; Y V ½Y 1ðy  E½Y Þ; ð15Þ
V ½X jY ¼ y ¼ V ½X   Cov½X ; Y V ½Y 1Cov½Y ;X : ð16Þ
In addition, this representation allows a covariance ma-
trix for modeling the dependencies between the parame-
ter values to be easily maintained.
3.6. Example cycle
As an example of the algorithm, a ﬂowchart version
of the algorithm along with example values from the
ﬁrst cycle for a patient in the benign prostatic hyperpla-
sia (BPH) decision context is illustrated in Fig. 5.
BPH is a non-cancerous enlargement of the prostate
gland. The prostate gland surrounds the urethra in
men and can impinge on the patency of the urethra if en-





(µ31, σ31)  (µ32, σ32) (µ33, σ33)
(µ3, σ3)
diagram shows quantities in set X that are observed with evidence in set
via arc reversal or through matrix operations.
Fig. 5. A ﬂowchart version of the algorithm with example values for one of the algorithm cycles. The parameter priors are initialized with those of
the population of which the patient is a member. The VOE is then calculated for each of the parameters of interest and the maximum VOE is selected.
A VOE of zero indicates that a parameter is not currently material to the decision. If the elicitation is determined to be worthwhile, an elicitation is
made on the parameter with the largest VOE. The observed assessment and parameter prior are converted from the natural space to the Gaussian
space via the log-odds transform. The parameter distribution is then updated to incorporate the newly observed evidence and converted back into the
natural space. The updating of the other parameters based on covariance has been omitted from the example for the sake of simplicity, but occurs
along with the currently assessed parameter. The VOE for each parameter is again calculated and the loop repeats until an additional elicitation is
deemed undesirable.
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or blockage can result in diﬃculty starting or stopping
urine ﬂow, incontinence, and urine retention (inability
to empty the urinary bladder). Urinary retention results
in the perceived need to urinate frequently and often,
especially during the night, and overﬂow incontinence.
These urinary symptoms are common among patientswith BPH, and range in severity from mild to moderate
to severe.
Fig. 6 shows a schematic of the model [41,42]. The
therapy options that the decision model considers are
surgical removal of the prostate gland, trans-urethral
resection or TUR, and watchful waiting, or surveil-
lance, of the disease. After the decision is made, the
Fig. 6. A schematic decision model for the benign prostatic hyperplasia treatment decision context [41,42]. Square nodes represent acts, hexagonal
nodes represent Markov processes, and trigonal nodes represent Markov states. The probability of transitioning between states is shown below the
edge connecting the states. The utilities associated with being in each state are labeled to the right of the nodes.
Table 1
Population values for benign prostatic hyperplasia decision model
[41,42]
Parameter Parameter Population
Deﬁnition Name Mean Variance
Utility(Moderate symptoms)a U(Mod) 0.735 0.0184
Utility(Impotence)a U(Imp) 0.725 0.0169
Utility(Total incontinence)a U(TotIncont) 0.650 0.0208
Utility(TUR)a U(TUR) 0.725 0.0169
Personal discount ratea r 0.09 0.0012
a When Utility(Asymptomatic) = 1 and Utility(Death) = 0.
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Should medical management be selected and the pa-
tients symptoms worsen, the patient undergoes sur-
gery. There is a perioperative risk of death that is
based on the patients age. The background rate of
death for each Markov state is based on life expectancy
tables and is not shown for the sake of simplicity. The
parameters that are assessable for an individual faced
with the BPH decision and their population priors
are listed in Table 1.
The example begins with initializing our parameter
priors from Table 1 with those of the population of
which the patient is a member. The value of elicitation
is then calculated for each of the parameters of interest
and the maximum VOE is selected. The utility for totalincontinence, U(TotIncont), and the utility for surgery,
U(TUR), both have a VOE of zero, indicating that
they are not currently material to the decision when
Fig. 7. A schematic decision model for the prostate cancer treatment
decision context [43–46]. Square nodes represent acts, circular nodes
represent chance events, hexagonal nodes represent Markov processes,
and diamond nodes represent utilities.
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parameters.
If the elicitation is determined to be worthwhile, an
elicitation is made on the parameter with the largest
VOE, namely the utility of moderate symptoms,
U(Mod), with a VOE of 0.291. Since the prior distribu-
tions for the utility parameters in the model are based
on time trade-oﬀ measurements, using a time-trade-oﬀ
approach for the elicitations would be appropriate.
The observed assessment for U(Mod) is 0.740. The
new observation is then converted from the natural
space to the Gaussian space via the log-odds transform
with mean, m, of 1.069 and an assumed Gaussian var-
iance, s2 of 0.1. The parameter prior is likewise con-
verted into the Gaussian space with a mean of 1.14
and a variance of 0.562. The parameter distribution is
then updated via the method described above to incor-
porate the newly observed evidence with a new mean of
1.0795 and a variance of 0.085 in the Gaussian space.
The updated distribution is then converted back into
the natural space with a mean, l, of 0.743 and variance,
r2, of 0.003. The updating of the other parameters
based on covariance has been omitted from the exam-
ple for the sake of simplicity, but occurs along with
the currently assessed parameter. The value of elicita-
tion for each parameter is again calculated and the loop
repeats until an additional elicitation is deemed
undesirable.4. Experimental results
We evaluated the algorithm by simulating patient
interactions with decision models for four medical treat-
ment decision domains (benign prostatic hypertrophy
management, screening for prostate cancer, genetic
screening for breast cancer in high-risk women, and the
pre-natal screening decision). We compared the results
of our algorithm with those of several traditional
approaches.
4.1. Decision contexts
In addition to the BPH decision context described
above is the decision about the treatment of prostate
cancer. Fig. 7 shows a schematic of the model [43–46].
Prostate cancer aﬀects many older men. It shares many
symptoms with BPH, but has the additional concern
that the cancer might also metastasize, or spread, to
other organs in the body. Once the cancer has metasta-
sized, the prognosis of the patient becomes very poor.
The decision context is one in which there is a trade-
oﬀ between the possible side-eﬀects of surgery versus
the side-eﬀects of medication. In addition, if the medica-
tion fails to prevent the cancer from progressing in the
future, the patient might need to undergo surgery at thattime. The rate and severity of complications from the
surgery increase with patient age.
The model considers the choice between aggressive
surgical treatment versus conservative medical treat-
ment. Should the cancer progress with conservative
treatment, surgery may be necessary. There is a change
of perioperative death. After surgery, there is a possibil-
ity of complications of impotence or urinary symptoms/
incontinence. The prognosis of the patient is modeled
using a Markov process.
The third decision context focuses on the decision
about genetic screening for breast cancer. Fig. 8 shows
a schematic of the model [47–49]. A group of identiﬁed
genetic mutations (BRCA1, BRCA2) have been corre-
lated with a signiﬁcant increase in rates of familial breast
and ovarian cancer, especially in certain demographic
groups. Women can be tested for the BRCA1 and
BRCA2 mutations, but the value of the test is highly
dependent on what treatment options, if any, they per-
sue with the knowledge of the test result. Women who
have a positive test result can elect to have both breasts
surgically removed, their ovaries removed, both breasts
and ovaries removed, or to undergo intensive medical
surveillance. The test is not perfect and false positives
and false negatives do occur. Also, the test only estab-
lishes a risk of disease, not its presence. Consequently,
the possible treatments are for prophylaxis and not cure.
The removal of the breasts and ovaries may leave some
tissue behind and, therefore, leave some reduced risk of
cancer. In addition, the removal of the ovaries results in
the inability of the woman to bear children and initiates
early menopause. The surgeries can aﬀect the womans
quality of life.
The model considers the choice between having the
genetic test performed and what action to take if the test
result is positive. Should the test be positive, a women
may elect to have both breasts surgically removed (bilat-
eral mastectomy) prophylactically, her ovaries surgically
removed (bilateral oophorectomy), have both surgeries,
or undergo regular frequent evaluations and imaging
Fig. 8. A schematic decision model for the breast cancer screening
decision context [47–49]. Square nodes represent acts, circular nodes
represent chance events, hexagonal nodes represent Markov processes,
and diamond nodes represent utilities.
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chance of having a positive BRCA1 test (BRCA1+), a
positive BRCA2 test (BRCA2+), or a negative test.Fig. 9. A schematic decision model for the pre-natal testing decision context [
and rounded box nodes represent values or utilities. Solid arrows between
denoting that the decision for amniocentesis, the test result, and whether a m
pregnancy is made.The prognosis of the women for each choice is modeled
using a Markov process.
The fourth decision context concerns pre-natal test-
ing. Fig. 9 shows a schematic of the model [50,51].
Amniocentesis is a form of pre-natal testing that pro-
vides information about possible genetic disorders that
a child might have, such as down syndrome. The risk
of having a down syndrome child is increased in women
who become pregnant over the age of 35. A womans
values may be such that early detection of a down af-
fected fetus and termination of the pregnancy would
be desirable. However, an increased risk of miscarriage
from the test might result in the loss of the fetus should
the women not wish to terminate the pregnancy, regard-
less of down status.
The model considers the choice about whether to
have the amniocentesis test performed and whether to
terminate the pregnancy on the basis of the test result.
Amniocentesis is associated with a risk of test-induced
miscarriage and the test is not perfect, with false nega-
tives and possible failure to obtain a test sample due
to technical diﬃculty. Down syndrome also increases
the likelihood of a natural miscarriage. The decision to
terminate the pregnancy is assumed to be made after
the amniocentesis decision with knowledge of the test re-
sult and whether a miscarriage has occurred.
4.2. Simulated population generation
We simulated populations of patients interacting with
each of the four models. The use of patient simulates al-
lowed for a more through evaluation of the algorithm as
the number of patients simulated could be arbitrarily set
and the representativeness of the population was en-
sured. Patient interactions were simulated by having
generated patient populations provide answers to50,51]. Square nodes represent acts, oval nodes represent chance events,
nodes represent relevance. The dashed arrows are informational arcs,
iscarriage has occurred are known before the decision to terminate the
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each population, subpopulations of equal size were ﬁrst
generated with a reinitialization of the random seed in
the pseudo-random number generator between each
subpopulation. The subpopulations were then merged
into the ﬁnal population. This approach was used to
minimize trend biases in the pseudo-random number
generator. A population of 6000 (six groups of 1000)
simulates was randomly generated for each decision do-
main. The simulates were assigned parameter values
randomly sampled from the population priors used to
develop each of the models.
The patient response model used was based on the
assumption of stable values and consistent responses
with noise in the answers. Speciﬁcally, we assumed that
all of the simulate answers were consistent with the true
value of the quantity, v, and that the value did not
change during the course of the interaction. We did
not model a learning eﬀect with the assessments (decreas-
ing noise with additional assessments) or a fatigue eﬀect
(increasing noise with additional assessments). The noise
in the responses was assumed to be Gaussian distributed
in the log-odds space and additive. For each measure-
ment, the error was sampled from a multi-variate Gauss-
ian distribution with a mean of 0 and the error rate,
actual, as the variance. The response, r, for an assessment
question was r = v + lo1 (Norminv (p = Rnd(0, 1),
l = 0, r2 = actual)).
The error for the simulate response, actual, is diﬀerent
from the error in measurements that the algorithm mod-
els, modeled. The value of actual represents the actual level
of noise in the measurements in the transformed space.
The value of modeled is the level of noise that the algorithm
expects to exist in the measurements it makes in the trans-
formed space. While both variables might take on the
same numerical value, they represent diﬀerent concepts
about the noise in the measurements. Value assessments
were assumed to have observational error of constant var-
iance at two levels, r2 = 0.0 and 0.1.
For the purpose of the simulations, we deﬁned three
states of information, or solutions, for the assessment
process: population, individual, and current. The popu-
lation solution, EP, represents the initial state of infor-
mation in which the parameter values are believed to
be the population priors. It deﬁnes an optimal policy
for the solution pP. The individual solution, EI, repre-
sents the state of information in which the quantity val-
ues are believed to be the exact values for the individual
patient with an optimal policy pI . The current solution,
EC, represents the current state of information during
the assessment process with the optimal policy pC.
4.3. Comparison to other approaches
We compared our approach to a set of commonly
used methods: the guideline approach, the fullassessment with random ordering approach, and the full
assessment with greedy optimal ordering approach. All
of the approaches assume that assessments are perfectly
observed with zero noise.
The guideline approach assumes that every individual
in the population is representative of the average patient
in the population. The average patient is deﬁned to be a
hypothetical individual whose values are the mean of
each of the quantity distributions. Thus, the values for
each individual are already known and no assessments
are necessary. This is analogous to the use of clinical
practice guidelines that are developed using population
values. Using the prostate cancer decision context as
an example, the four parameter values for each patient
would be set to the population mean.
The full assessment with random ordering approach
involved sequentially measuring all quantities of interest
once in a random order for each simulate and assigning
the measurements as the simulates true values. It makes
the assumption that the measurements made are error-
free and need only be observed once. It also assumes that
all parameters in the model need to be assessed for each
patient. The performance of the approach is determined
by the ordering of the values to be assessed based on the
underlying model. A random ordering was used to dem-
onstrate an average case performance of the approach
to avoid unintentional positive or negative biases caused
by a particular ordering. This is analogous to the current
assessment of values using a sequential assessment pro-
cess. Using the prostate cancer decision context as an
example, the four parameter values for each patient
would each be assessed once in a random order.
The full assessment with greedy optimal ordering is
identical to the previous approach except that the
parameters are assessed in order of decreasing contribu-
tion of variance or error in the model for the average pa-
tient in the population. This is generally accomplished
by performing one-way sensitivity analyses on each
parameter bounded by its population prior and ordering
parameters according to decreasing ranges of expected
utility (based on diﬀerence in expected utility between
upper and lower bounds of the parameter). Again, every
parameter is assessed once and assumed to be a perfect
assessment. Using the BPH decision context as an exam-
ple, the ﬁve parameter values for each patient would
each be assessed once in optimal order for the popula-
tion: U(Mod), Discount Rate, U(Imp), U(TotIncont),
U(TUR).
We deﬁned model customization error as the diﬀer-
ence between the expected utility of the optimal policy
for an individual given perfect full information and the
expected utility for the policy selected given the current
state of information. The accuracy of each approach is
the error after the ﬁnal observation. Although our ap-
proach is capable of any number of observations, we
choose to limit the comparison to the total number of
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ciency of each approach is measured by how quickly
the error is reduced (the curve approaches the horizontal
axis). The robustness to noise for each approach is its
ability to maintain accuracy and eﬃciency with increases
in observation noise.
The results of the simulations for the four decision
contexts are shown in Fig. 10. The average error was
plotted for each approach as a function of the assess-
ment count for the two cases of response noise variance:
r2 = 0.0 is shown in the top graphs, r2 = 0.1 is shown in
the middle graphs. The value of elicitation as a function
of assessment number for both cases of response noise
variance is shown in the bottom graphs.
The guideline approach demonstrates the error if no
information is gathered about individuals averaging
over the population. The plots show that all of the ap-
proaches that assess values result in a perfectly custom-
ized model for all four decision contexts provided that
the response noise variance is zero. The optimal order-
ing approach is more eﬃcient than the random ordering
approach, but our approach is the most eﬃcient for all
four decision contexts. Once the observations become
noisy, the full assessment approaches become less accu-
rate. Our algorithm required fewer assessments for all
four decision contexts and resulted in smaller error
regardless of the number of assessments made.
For two of the models (genetic screening in breast
cancer and pre-natal diagnosis), the value of elicitation
increases after the ﬁrst assessment is made, and the error
drops more after the second assessment than it does
after the ﬁrst. This is due to the fact that the ﬁrst assess-
ment makes parameters that were not material to the
decision for the population material for the individuals
decision, i.e., the most informative question is actually
the second question asked conditioned on the answer
to the ﬁrst question. The value of elicitation increases
for the next measurement since there was a greater po-
tential for the decision to be aﬀected by the newly con-
sidered parameters. The error of the greedy optimal
ordering approach also remains high since there is a sub-
population for whom the population optimal ordering is
not appropriate.5. Discussion and extensions
Traditional decision analytic approaches develop a
customized model for every individual, often only
including states or consequences relevant to the individ-
ual. This process, in most cases, is too costly and labor
intensive to be practical for everyday use in important
personal decisions, such as those in medicine. By devel-
oping a consultation system that is based on a generic
decision model, we can amortize the cost of model devel-
opment over many users.There is a fundamental trade-oﬀ in using a generic
model versus an individual model. A generic model must
be able to consider the states and consequences that
would be relevant to any of its potential users. This
has the beneﬁt that only one model needs to be devel-
oped and maintained. The cost is that it would be labo-
rious for an individual to have to explicitly assess all of
the parameters in the generic model regardless of the
materiality of each parameter to the individuals deci-
sion. (For example, a patient that did not want surgery
as an option for their treatment would still need to as-
sess parameters pertaining to surgical outcomes in a
generic model.) The goal of our algorithm is to minimize
this increased burden of assessment required with gener-
ic consultation systems.
We have described a novel approach for eﬃciently
individualizing generic decision models based on using
assessments of parameter values as evidence of their ac-
tual values for a speciﬁc individual. We model the uncer-
tainty about the parameter values as Gaussian PDFs of
the log-odds transform of the values. This representa-
tion lets us represent accurately even extreme values
on the [0,1] interval with robust distributions and
dependence among parameters. By deﬁning a value
and cost of elicitation, we are able to select the optimal
assessment to make next and determine when further
elicitation is not worthwhile. We believe that this ap-
proach will help mitigate the customization burden
and allow generic systems to ﬁnd practical use.
Our results demonstrate that our approach is more
eﬃcient than both the standard approach of full assess-
ment and the greedy optimal ordering assessment for
four decision context models. In addition, as the noise
in the responses increased, our approach retained both
its accuracy and eﬃciency as compared to the full and
greedy optimal assessments. We feel that these results
show that our implementation can make the customiza-
tion of a decision model of user preferences practical,
especially in light of noisy observations.
An interesting addition to this is our algorithms abil-
ity to recognize and interact with accordingly individu-
als whose values place them into subgroups of the
population for whom the population as a whole is not
representative. In these situations, the value of elicita-
tion does not always diminish with each assessment. In
fact, it is likely to increase after some assessments are
made as is evidenced by the graphs of value of elicitation
for breast cancer screening and pre-natal testing. The in-
crease in the value of elicitation after the ﬁrst question is
asked indicates that the individuals response to the
assessment has made material aspects of the decision
that are irrelevant for the average member of the popu-
lation. By learning more about how an individuals val-
ues compared with a demographically matched cohort,
our algorithm is able to not only determine whether
an individual has a value set that diﬀers signiﬁcantly

















































































































































































































































































































































Fig. 10. Comparison of error for our algorithm, guideline, full assessment, and greedy optimal solutions for the four decision contexts with response
noise of variance r2 = 0.0 (top) and 0.1 (middle). Value of elicitation is shown as a function of assessments for both noise levels (bottom).
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assessment interview in an appropriate order for each
individual. Those users that have values diﬀerent from
their peers are the individuals that stand to beneﬁt most
from such an intervention, as they stand to gain the
most value from an individualized decision.
The approach described in this paper has some limi-
tations to its use. First, if the algorithm recommends
multiple assessments of the same parameter, we might
minimize bias in the users responses by developing dif-
ferent assessment questions for the parameter. Second,
the approach requires that a decision model and prior
distributions exist for the decision context to be ad-
dressed. Third, a reasonable estimate of the noise in
the measurements is required. Finally, the approach
only provides a mechanism for incorporating observa-
tions from one user at a time.
One natural extension to our method would allow the
individual to assign a conﬁdence to the answer to an
assessment question. This would permit us to scale the
variance of the observed evidence to correspond to the
conﬁdence with which it was provided. Another exten-
sion would be to use a sliding window for incorporating
assessments. As additional assessments are made, earlier
ones can be down weighted or ignored. This would al-
low the algorithm to incorporate the notion that as users
gain experience in a particular domain, the accuracy of
assessments might increase.
We believe that our approach provides a practical
solution to the automation of real-time individualiza-
tion of generic decision models with potentially noisy
observations of individual values. By providing a sys-
tem that is able to acquire evidence about an individ-
uals values in an adaptive way to determine what, if
any, meaningful diﬀerences exist between the individ-
uals values and the values of his/her peers, we hope
to be able to facilitate the inclusion of individual health
values into the healthcare decision making process.
Such a step forward might help to make individual val-
ues a staple of the patient–physician encounter and has
the potential of improving the quality of healthcare
while making the delivery of individualized care more
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